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Start with a Presumption She Doesn’t
Want to Be Dead: Fatal Flaws in
Guardianships of Individuals with
Intellectual Disability
Nicole M. Arsenault†
Introduction
Guardianships1 are usually seen in cases involving two
groups of people: children and the elderly. Individuals who come
before the courts needing a guardian due to an intellectual
disability2 represent only a small subset of cases. Although the
support needs of these adults are extremely diverse and are
dictated by individual characteristics and circumstances not
usually seen in the general population, in most jurisdictions, the
†. J.D., University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, 2011;
B.A., University at Albany, State University of New York, 1995. This article is
dedicated to Debbie, whose brave battle brought the later surrenders of so many
others into sharp relief. The author also gratefully acknowledges the help of Aaron
R. Parker, Esq., for helping her learn to write, Ralph C. Brashier, LL.M., for
helping her learn to reason, and Marko Horn, Ph.D. for listening and critiquing
those many hours while it all came together. This is the foundation that made this
article possible, and the author is endlessly thankful.
1. The term “guardianship” refers to a legally-sanctioned arrangement where
certain decisional rights are transferred from an individual found to be
incapacitated (i.e., a ward) to another person or entity for the care and protection of
the ward’s person. When rights regarding the ward’s estate are transferred, this is
most often called a conservatorship. The terms are sometimes used
interchangeably. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-101 (2015) (defining a
“guardian” as a person appointed to provide “partial or full supervision,
protection[,] and assistance” to a person or minor, and a “conservator” as a person
appointed to make decisions on behalf of the ward and provide “partial or full
supervision, protection[,] and assistance.”).
This Article uses the term
“guardianship.”
2. Intellectual disability is defined as a “disorder with onset during the
developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning
deficits in conceptual, social[,] and practical domains.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013).
With the passage of Rosa’s Law in 2010, the United States has advocated a more
deferential reference to individuals affected in the manner described above as
having an intellectual disability rather than mental retardation. Rosa’s Law, Pub.
L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010). Research for this Article necessarily
involved reference to materials published prior to 2010. Where practical, the
author has substituted the term “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” in
deference to this forward progress in our collective respect for the rights and
position in society of those persons impacted by this and similar diagnoses.
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same laws and regulations govern the entire field. Without
specific guidance and oversight of guardians who care for adults
with intellectual disability, a variety of problems arise.
The competence of people with intellectual disability to make
their own decisions is a tricky area. Depending upon the advocacy
being brought to bear, supporters and occasionally the individuals
themselves argue for more or less recognition of the choices they
make. In June 2015, I was at a conference and the first two
sessions I attended illustrated this point: the first argued for less
decisional capacity for offenders with intellectual disability in
capital cases and the second argued for greater self-determination
and respect of individual decisions. Although the principles of
person-centeredness that pervade the supporting culture direct us
toward a greater respect of individual choice, there is no clear line
between the arguments for more or less recognition of capacity.
But how does this work in cases where a health care decision with
potentially life-altering consequences is being made?
Beginning in 1996, I had the chance to work with a woman
named Debbie.3 I met her while she was in remission from
prolymphocytic leukemia, a rare and aggressive form of the
disease. I worked with her when the cancer returned for a second
and final time. Debbie was a funny lady. She had a strong sense
of the ridiculous and liked to laugh at everyone around her. Her
life was shaped, in part, by an intellectual disability. Although no
court ever determined that Debbie lacked the capacity to make
decisions for herself, in reality, she needed a lot of support.
Debbie had a family and a network of social services to guide her
through decisions she did not fully understand. Thus, while her
rights were never formally transferred to someone else, Debbie
had decision-making support similar to that of the many persons
with intellectual disability who are under a guardianship.
Debbie understood general concepts, but was often less clear
on their application to her. When Debbie first received the
diagnosis, her sister Susan and other supporters tried to help her
understand what she was facing. Although she had years of
treatment, check-ups, bone biopsies, and countless hours spent in
a doctor’s office, it was not until the last weeks of her life that
Debbie finally appeared to understand that she was dying. Before
that point, her radiation and chemotherapy treatments were
something to be endured and laughed about. There were also

3. Debbie’s story is used in this Article with the express written permission of
her family.
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some misunderstandings along the way. Debbie had a cat of
uncertain temperament, but unquestioned loyalty. When Debbie’s
family worked on planning her final services, her sister suggested
having a cat etched on her grave marker. Debbie became very
upset, thinking that the plan was to bury “Kitty.” It may have
been the lack of understanding of death and freedom from fear
that kept Debbie alive for so long. She was something of a medical
miracle, living over three years with a diagnosis that, in those
days, was terminal within six months.
Debbie was the first person I met with an intellectual
disability who battled cancer. I have met dozens more since then,
but she is one of very few who has received the same aggressive
level of treatment a non-disabled person would likely pursue.
Intuitively, one might think that a person receiving decisional
support would be more likely to be diagnosed early and supported
to seek whatever treatment is likely to save or prolong his or her
life. There is a line of research that indicates this is not true, at
least as it pertains to adults with intellectual disability. As a
group, these individuals are less likely than members of the
general population to receive routine screenings, such as pap
smears, mammograms, and colonoscopies, and are more likely to
die of cancer.4
This Article explores the areas where guardianship laws fail
individuals whose capacity is impaired by intellectual disability.
Part I reviews the history of the concept of guardianship, its
origins in the common law of England, adoption in the United
States, and evolution to the laws on the books today. Part II
summarizes the process by which guardians are appointed. Part
III examines the practice of guardianship, decisional standards,
and major case law relevant to the issue. Part IV looks at how
persons with intellectual disability fit into guardianship law. Part
V turns to the unique challenges faced by people who step into the
shoes of individuals with intellectual disability to make decisions
on their behalf and how this can lead to tragic results, even when
underpinned by the best of intentions. Part VI offers suggestions
for improving the legal and practical aspects of guardianship for
these individuals.

4. See Nechama W. Greenwood et al., More Than Just a Mammogram: Breast
Cancer Screening Perspectives of Relatives of Women with Intellectual Disability, 52
INTELL. AND DEV. DISABILITIES 444, 452 (2014); Susan M. Havercamp et al., Health
Disparities Among Adults with Developmental Disabilities, Adults with Other
Disabilities, and Adults Not Reporting Disability in North Carolina, 119 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 418, 421 (2004).
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I. A Brief History of Guardianship
Like many legal doctrines, the concept of guardianship
reached American jurisprudence via English common law.
Guardianship springs from the doctrine of parens patriae, which
refers to the right of the state to serve as protector for those who
cannot care for themselves.5 This practice began when the
English monarch assumed authority over the estates of orphaned
infants and persons incompetent by reasons of “idiocy” or
“lunacy.”6 One early court explained the rationale behind the
protective role being taken up by the monarch rather than a
family member: “It is not a profitable jurisdiction of the crown, but
for the benefit of infants themselves, who must have some common
parent.”7
In spite of the stated humanitarian motive, parens patriae
facilitated some very profitable arrangements for the king from its
earliest days. The crown enjoyed substantial largesse from those
estates whose management it usurped under the role of “Father of
the Country,” and abuses led to an eventual overhaul of the
system in the seventeenth century.8 It took two further centuries
of development for the doctrine to take on the beneficent patina it
has today.9 The later-reported cases invoking parens patriae
power involve guardianship of minors, in which responsibility
reverted automatically to the crown when the natural guardian
(i.e., the father) was unavailable or unfit.10
In 1890, the doctrine of parens patriae made it across the
ocean when the Supreme Court of the United States expressly
endorsed it in Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States.11 The Court held that property seized
from the former Church of Latter-Day Saints, which had been
designated as a charity, would be redistributed for similar use by
the state, rather than returned to the donors.12 The basis of this
part of the decision rested upon parens patriae.13 The Court
distinguished the operation of parens patriae power in the United

5. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (3rd pocket ed. 2006).
6. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L. J. 195, 195–96 (1978).
7. Id. at 205.
8. Id. at 199–201.
9. Id. at 201–05.
10. Id. at 205–06.
11. 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890).
12. Id. at 58–59.
13. Id.
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States from how it worked in England: in the United States, the
legislature, rather than the monarch, takes on the protective
role.14
To get an idea of how pervasive parens patriae power has
become in our society (and how much we take it for granted), one
need only to contemplate the areas where it is commonly applied.
As the doctrine took a foothold in the United States, parens
patriae empowered states to oversee child welfare, even going as
far as restricting parental control over children15 where there was
a compelling interest for doing so.16 The power of parens patriae
extends to individuals afflicted with serious mental illness. With a
demonstration of necessity and appropriate due process
protections, states may administer antipsychotic medications to
involuntarily committed patients suffering from mental illness,
even when the patients refuse this treatment.17 The power is also
used to support removal of decisional rights from the elderly in the
management of their estates and persons.18 And it is used to
support surrogate health care decisions for persons with
intellectual disability, including end-of-life decisions.19

14. Id. at 58.
15. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (upholding a New
York law prohibiting the sale of pornographic materials to minors, the Court
referenced society’s interest in protecting the welfare of children as “transcendent”)
(quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333 (N.Y. 1965)); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (stating that “[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and of the
whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and
citizens[,]” as a reason for upholding a Massachusetts law proscribing work for
children under the age of twelve).
16. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (holding that the
state’s interest was “de minimis” and therefore an insufficient basis for removing
three children from the custody of their unwed father where no evidence showed
father to be unfit).
17. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 981 (2d Cir. 1983)
(upholding a New York law allowing for involuntary commitment and medication of
patients with mental illness where a hearing was provided and mental health
professionals conducted regular reviews).
18. See Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of
Parens Patriae, 40 MO. L. REV. 215, 231–32 (1975).
19. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977). In considering whether to allow removal of treatment from a
terminally ill resident of the state school who had an intellectual disability, the
Court opined:
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome
question—whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be
withheld from a person incapable of making his own decision—as
constituting a “gratuitous encroachment” on the domain of medical
expertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that
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At points in its history, a very broad view of parens patriae
power has been sanctioned by legal scholars and the courts.20 In
other instances, judges and justices have reached into previouslyunfettered state practice and added a healthy dose of restraint.
An example of the Supreme Court applying its restraint in parens
patriae can be found in In re Gault, a near-total rejection of
Arizona’s method of ordering commitment of alleged juvenile
delinquents to state facilities.21 In Gault, the Court reviewed the
practice of trying juvenile offenders without affording them the
benefit of counsel and other due process protections commonly
afforded to adults.22 Justice Fortas, writing for the majority,
likened the gravity of the consequences faced by the fifteen-yearold in Gault to a felony proceeding, referring to the threat of
juvenile detention as “the awesome prospect of incarceration in a
state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21.”23 The
Court ultimately held that a juvenile commitment proceeding,
which can result in loss of liberty for a minor, should include all or
nearly all of those due process protections afforded to the accused
in criminal proceedings.24 Calling upon the language of an earlier
opinion, the Court went on to explicitly reject the state’s position
that proceedings were conducted without due process formality to
better serve the best interests of the minors: “[T]here is no place in
our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without
effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.”25
The lessons of Gault and similar decisions coming in its wake
are not that parens patriae powers are less broad or invasive than
in times past, although one could make the argument that the
forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created.
Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the
“morality and conscience of our society,” no matter how highly motivated
or impressively constituted.
Id. at 435.
20. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976) (“The court’s
action . . . is not limited by any narrow bounds, but it is empowered to stretch forth
its arm in whatever direction its aid and protection may be needed.”).
21. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. Id. at 5–7.
23. Id. at 36–37.
24. Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)) (“We do
not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we
do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.”)).
25. Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966)).
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impact of the decisions leads to such a result. The real lesson in
due process is that it is acceptable for states to interfere and
subvert the rights of private citizens to protect the welfare of
vulnerable individuals; just be sure the interference is necessary
to protect a legitimate state interest and that all procedures are
followed to the letter.
The practice of appointing guardians to make decisions on
behalf of persons incapable of making some or all of their own
decisions is one of the outgrowths of parens patriae.26 Although
many guardians, particularly family members, may be unaware of
the nature of their appointment, guardians are “delegatee[s] of the
state’s parens patriae power.”27 Thus, in a purely legal sense, a
mother and father appointed as guardians for medical decisions
over their adult daughter with an intellectual disability, in
consenting to or withholding consent for a medical procedure,
speak not as parents, but as the state. Whether the parents in
this hypothetical understand the distinction between the decision
they made for their seventeen-year-old daughter and the one a
court order authorized them to make for that same daughter, now
twenty-one, is less than clear. While courts are charged with
oversight of the guardianship arrangements they sanction,
resources to police this responsibility are scarce or non-existent,
and the reality is that most guardianships go unmonitored after
the initial court hearing concludes.28
Problems with guardianships came into sharp public focus in
1987, when the Associated Press published an article chronicling a
study of guardianships in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia.29 The authors found that the guardianship system was
“dangerously burdened and troubled[,]” stripping vulnerable older
adults “to the rights of a 5-year-old” by creating guardianships
that
“sometimes
result[]
in
financial
or
physical
mistreatment . . . .”30
Although the article focused on
guardianships of the elderly, the findings had system-wide
implications, and the response was immediate. New guardianship
26. Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Third National Guardianship Summit
Introduction, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012).
27. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425 (Mo. 1988).
28. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1160–62.
29. Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing
System Part I: Declared ‘Legally Dead’ by a Troubled System, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 19, 1987), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Guardians-of-the-Elderly-AnAiling-System-Part-I-Declared-Legally-Dead-by-a-Troubled-System/id1198f64bb05d9c1ec690035983c02f9f.
30. Id.
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legislation was introduced at the federal and state levels with a
goal of reforming the system to prevent those abuses the article
brought to light.31
In 1988, the American Bar Association’s Commission on the
Mentally Disabled and Commission on Legal Problems of the
Elderly, working with national guardianship advocacy
associations, brought together a group of experts to examine the
state of guardianship systems and make recommendations for
reform.32
The Symposium produced thirty-one draft
recommendations, which were later ratified by the American Bar
Association.33 The recommendations focused on procedural due
process, legal representation for the proposed ward, determination
of incapacity, judicial practices, accountability of guardians, and
guardianship agencies.34
Over the ensuing years, many changes to guardianship laws
were made throughout the country.35 In 1997, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised the
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (UGPPA)
and incorporated the previously free-standing Act into the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) as Article 5.36 This was an effort to
standardize guardianship law and to separate laws regarding
incapacitated adults from those regarding minors. As of the 1997
amendment, Section 2 of the UGPPA addresses guardianship of
minors and Sections 3 and 4 address guardianships and
conservatorships of adults.37 Unfortunately, states have largely

31. John Parry, Selected Recommendations from the National Guardianship
Symposium at Wingspread, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 398, 398
(1988) (stating that the AP report “led to the publication of more than 300 stories in
various newspapers” and the enactment of guardianship legislation at the federal
and state levels “aimed at addressing many reporting abuses and deficiencies”).
32. Id.
33. Comm’n on Mentally Disabled & Comm’n on Legal Problems of the Elderly,
Guardianship, An Agenda for Reform: Recommendations of the National
Guardianship Symposium and Policy of the American Bar Association, 13 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 271, 275 (1989) [hereinafter An Agenda for Reform].
34. Id. at 277–305.
35. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1160 (“The late 1980s and the 1990s
saw sweeping changes in state laws involving improved due process, a more
functional determination of capacity not based on labels or age, use of less
restrictive alternatives, limited orders, and greater guardian accountability. The
‘backwater’ topic of guardianship was finally gaining visibility in statehouses
across the nation.”).
36. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 471
(1997).
37. Id. at 509–71.
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given the UGPPA the cold shoulder; by the end of 2016, it had only
been adopted in five states and the District of Columbia.38
In 2001, a second National Guardianship Symposium
convened.39 This effort produced sixty-eight recommendations
focusing on developing standards for interstate transfers of
guardianships, practice guidelines, education, research, funding,
agency guardianships, monitoring, and accountability.40 Although
these reform efforts made significant inroads towards improving
processes and protecting the rights of wards throughout the
country, troubling issues lingered.41
Some courts blatantly
disregarded new regulations and best practice guidelines, and
stories of individuals subject to serious abuses through
guardianship began to emerge again in the mid-2000s.42 These
stories prompted changes in several state laws and initiatives on
the Federal level as well.43
The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws took another stab at
reform with development of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (UAGPPJA), which was
added to the UPC as Article 5A.44 By the end of 2016, the
UAGPPJA has been enacted by forty-five states and the District of
Columbia, making this Act far more successful than the UGPPA.45
In 2011, a third National Guardianship Symposium
convened.46
This time, the focus shifted to developing
recommendations to incorporate person-centered practices into
guardianship proceedings.47 Indeed, this person-centered focus
38. The Uniform Law Commission maintains a website that tracks enactment
of the various uniform acts. See Legislative Enactment Status: Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act (1997), UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings%20Act%20(199
7) (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
39. A. Frank Johns & Charles P. Sabatino, Wingspan—The Second National
Guardianship Conference, Introduction, 31 STETSON L. REV. 573, 573–74 (2002).
40. Wingspan—The
Second
National
Guardianship
Conference,
Recommendations, 31 STETSON L. REV. 595, 595–609 (2002).
41. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1159–60.
42. See id. at 1160–61.
43. See id. at 1161–62.
44. UNIF. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS JURISDICTION
ACT, 8A U.L.A. 10 (2007).
45. See Legislative Enactment Status: Adult Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Adult%20Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proce
edings%20Jurisdiction%20Act (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
46. See Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excellence and
Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1991, 1991 (2012) [hereinafter Third
National Guardianship].
47. Leslie P. Francis, Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards of
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pervades the findings and recommendations developed by the
Symposium.48 It is unclear yet what the impact of these latest
ambitious reform efforts will be, but it is evident that
guardianship practice has come a long way since King Edward I of
England decided to take over the estates of his incapacitated
subjects.49
II. The Mechanics of State Guardianship Systems: What the
Courts Do
There is no national procedure for appointment of a
guardian; the practice belongs to the individual states to define.
Although each state has a vehicle for evaluating capacity and
transferring decisional rights, there are as many models as there
are jurisdictions. This becomes evident when one compares
guardianship statutes from state to state. Although there are
many differences in language and structure, there are some
elements common to every state.
From start to finish,
guardianship proceedings have several tasks or steps that must be
completed, with variations in the order of the second and third
steps.
Step 1: Petition
Guardianship laws throughout the country have liberal
standing requirements for initial filing of the petition.50 The
statutes of most states allow any interested person to file a
petition for guardianship of an adult, which makes it easy to
initiate the process. The required contents of petitions have
become more uniform over the years. Although some states have
additional requirements, in general, a petition must contain: the
name and demographic information of the person alleged to be
Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2012) (“A core theme of the Summit is
that shaping guardianship practices to center on the person him- or herself—socalled person-centeredness—is the touchtone of excellence in guardianship.”).
48. Third National Guardianship, supra note 46, 1199–1205.
49. See Custer, supra note 6, at 195–96.
50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-646 (West 2014) (“[a]ny person”);
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-10 (2007) (“[a]ny interested person or persons, including the
proposed ward”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.044 (LexisNexis 2014) (“a proposed
ward, a governmental agency, a nonprofit corporation or any interested person”);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-2-2 (LexisNexis 2014) (“the individual alleged to be a
protected person, by a person who is responsible for the individual’s care or
custody, by the facility providing care to the individual, by the person that the
individual has nominated as guardian or conservator, by a person acting as a de
facto guardian or de facto conservator or by any other interested person, including,
but not limited to, the department of health and human resources”).
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incapacitated; the nature of his or her disability; the name and
contact information of the proposed guardian and that person’s
qualifications; the names and contact information of any family
members; the specific rights to be transferred if the guardianship
is granted; the rationale for transferring those rights; and an
inventory of the property owned by the person alleged to be
incapacitated.51
Step 2: Notice
After the petition is filed, each state has a requirement that
the petitioner and others receive notice of the petition and that a
hearing has been scheduled.52 Timing of notice varies and
different states measure timing in different ways. Some states
count the days before the hearing, and require notice to be served
by as few as five53 to as many as twenty54 days before the hearing.
The UGPPA requires a fourteen-day notice.55
Some states
measure the timing of notice from the filing of the petition,56 while
other states do not require a specific number of days, but instead
rely on the courts to provide “reasonable” notice.57 Still other
states do not expressly specify a timing of notice.58 Some statutes
require that notice be read to the respondent.59 In addition to the
51. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-5-1 (LexisNexis 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5303 (West 2013).
52. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5309 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331
(West 2014); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-10 (West 2013).
53. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-111 (2013).
54. E.g., 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (West 2005); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-1-401 (2009).
55. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 113(a), 8A U.L.A.
10 (1997).
56. E.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4543 (2013) (requiring that notice be
mailed within three days of the filing); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.030 (West
2006) (requiring that notice be served “not more than five court days after the
petition has been filed”).
57. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3901(c) (2007) (“The Court shall by rule
provide for reasonable notice to the person with an alleged disability and to such
others, if any, as the Court may deem desirable; provided that, in all cases where a
guardian of the person or guardian of the property of an adult with a disability is
sought, the person with an alleged disability shall be entitled to representation by
counsel . . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 475.075 (2009) (“The notice shall be signed by the
judge or clerk of the court and . . . served in person on the respondent a reasonable
time before the date set for the hearing.”).
58. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.554 (West 2014).
59. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331 (West 2016) (“Notice of the filing of a
petition to determine incapacity and a petition for the appointment of a guardian if
any and copies of the petitions must be served on and read to the alleged
incapacitated person.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-17.1 (2011) (“The court officer shall
present the written notice and shall also read the notice to the respondent.”).
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respondent, most states require that other persons receive notice
of the proceedings. Several persons or entities may be entitled to
notice, including spouses, adult children, parents, next of kin,
heirs-at-law, any person named in the petition, provider of
residential care (including institutional providers such as nursing
homes), counsel, guardians ad litem, and interested persons
designated by the court.60
Step 3: Counsel
One of the most significant impacts of recent guardianship
reform is the availability of counsel to the person alleged to be
incapacitated in a guardianship proceeding. Several jurisdictions
require the appointment of counsel as a matter of right.61
Appointment is permissive in some states, although the courts are
usually bound to appoint counsel if requested or necessary.62
While each state has statutory guidance on the appointment of
counsel for the respondent, guardians ad litem receive less
attention. Those statutes that speak to appointment of a guardian
ad litem, as with the appointment of counsel, take one of two
approaches: either to require appointment,63 or leave it to the
60. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-103 (LexisNexis 2009) (including a spouse, adult
children, parents, a current guardian or conservator, nearest living adult relative,
or any other person as directed by the court); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3371 (West
2016) (including the attorney of the alleged incapacitated person, any guardian
then serving, next of kin, such other interested persons as the court may direct);
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-12 (2007) (including the proposed ward’s legal counsel and
guardian ad litem (if any), the petitioner and the petitioner’s legal counsel (if any),
all adult individuals, and other persons who are named in the petition); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 464-A:5 (LexisNexis 2007) (including the attorney of the proposed
ward, relatives whose names and addresses appear on the petition, the proposed
guardian, the petitioner, or the medical director of a state or private institution, if
the proposed ward was ever a patient of said institution); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1517.1 (2011) (including respondent’s spouse, heirs at law, the administrator of any
care and treatment facility where the respondent resides or receives primary
services, any individual or entity known or reasonably known to the petitioner to
be regularly providing protective services to the respondent).
61. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:6 (LexisNexis 2007) (describing the
right to counsel as “absolute and unconditional”).
62. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B § 5-106 (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that
counsel shall be appointed “if the ward, incapacitated person or person to be
protected or someone on his [or her] behalf requests appointment of counsel; or if
the court determines at any time in the proceeding that the interests of the ward,
incapacitated person or person to be protected are or may be inadequately
represented”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5305 (2014) (stating that counsel shall be
appointed “[i]f the individual alleged to be incapacitated requests legal counsel or
the guardian ad litem determines it is in the individual’s best interest to have legal
counsel”).
63. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5305 (West 2012) (setting out the
duties of the guardian ad litem, whose appointment is required).
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judge’s discretion.64 Where a guardian ad litem is appointed, some
states provide statutory guidance for which inquiries should be
made on behalf of the court, who to consult, and the types of
expertise the guardian ad litem should possess or seek out in
another.65
Step 4: Hearing
The hearing is the final procedural step in appointment of a
guardian. One of the most frightening findings reported in the
Associated Press article was that forty-nine percent of wards did
not attend their guardianship hearing.66
Today, almost all
guardianship laws explicitly recognize the right of a person alleged
to be incapacitated to be present at his or her hearing.67 Some
states have a more stringent requirement, mandating that, in the
absence of defined circumstances, the person attend the hearing or
that the hearing be brought to the person.68 Many statutes allow
for respondent’s presence to be waived with a showing of good
cause.69 For a guardian to be appointed, the majority of states
64. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B § 5-106 (LexisNexis 2011) (“The court may
appoint as guardian ad litem, an individual or any public or charitable agency to
investigate the condition of the ward, incapacitated person or person to be
protected and make appropriate recommendations to the court.”).
65. E.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-10 (West 2007) (“The guardian ad
litem may consult with a person who by training or experience is qualified to work
with persons with a developmental disability, persons with mental illness, or
physically disabled persons, or persons disabled because of mental deterioration,
depending on the type of disability that is alleged.”).
66. Bayles & McCartney, supra note 29.
67. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-213 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-650
(West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-3-106 (2015).
68. E.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11 (McKinney 2006) (“The hearing must
be conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be incapacitated, either at the
courthouse or where the person alleged to be incapacitated resides, so as to permit
the court to obtain its own impression of the person’s capacity. If the person
alleged to be incapacitated physically cannot come or be brought to the courthouse,
the hearing must be conducted where the person alleged to be incapacitated resides
unless . . . all the information before the court clearly establishes that (i) the person
alleged to be incapacitated is completely unable to participate in the hearing or (ii)
no meaningful participation will result from the person’s presence at the hearing.”);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.0535 (LexisNexis 2014) (“A proposed ward who is found
in this State must attend the hearing for the appointment of a guardian unless: (a)
A certificate signed by a physician or psychiatrist . . . specifically states the
condition of the proposed ward, the reasons why the proposed ward is unable to
appear in court and whether the proposed ward’s attendance at the hearing would
be detrimental to the physical or mental health of the proposed ward; or (b) A
certificate signed by any other person the court finds qualified to execute a
certificate . . . .”).
69. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.331 (West 2016) (stating that presence is
required “unless waived by the alleged incapacitated person or the person’s

36

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 35:23

require a finding of incapacity by clear and convincing evidence,70
although New Hampshire expects incapacity to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt,71 and Wyoming requires only a preponderance
of evidence.72 Once the burden of proof is met, and it is
established to the satisfaction of the court that a person lacks
capacity to make some or all decisions, the judge must determine
which rights to transfer to the guardian. The court may order a
full (plenary) guardianship, transferring all or nearly all of the
rights of the incapacitated person to the guardian, or take a more
conservative approach, granting a limited guardianship covering
only those areas where decisional incapacity is specifically
proven.73
Step 5: Monitoring
One scholarly article about guardianship referred to the
procedure of adjudicating an incapacitated person and appointing
a guardian as the “front end” of the process, and the ensuing
accountability of the guardian and court monitoring as the “back
end.”74 Ten years later, the same authors wrote that, in spite of
sweeping changes to the law nationally, the back end has not seen
the same level of reform as the front end, and although monitoring
is both required and necessary, resources are largely unavailable
to facilitate assurance of guardian accountability.75 Some level of
post-adjudication monitoring of guardianships is required under
attorney or unless good cause can be shown for his or her absence”); IND. CODE
ANN. § 29-3-5-1(d) (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that the person alleged to be
incapacitated must be present unless he or she has “voluntarily waived notice of
the hearing,” there is evidence the person “voluntarily consented to the
appointment of a guardian,” it is not “in the person’s best interest to be present
because of a threat to the health or safety” of the person, or it is “impossible or
impractical for the alleged incapacitated person to be present”); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-3063 (2005) (stating that attendance is required “unless the court makes a
finding prior to the trial that the presence of the proposed ward . . . will be
injurious to the person’s health or welfare, or that the proposed
ward’s . . . impairment is such that the person could not meaningfully participate
in the proceedings, or that the proposed ward . . . has filed with the court a written
waiver of such person’s right to appear in person”).
70. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13-26-113 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5311 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303 (West 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
29A-5-312 (2004).
71. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464A:8 (LexisNexis 2007).
72. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-104 (2015).
73. Mary J. Quinn & Howard S. Krooks, The Relationship Between the
Guardian and the Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1611, 1620–33 (2012).
74. Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability Then and Now:
Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 867 (2002).
75. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1160–61.
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the laws of every state.76 There is little consistency, however, in
how this is accomplished.77 In fact, a 2006 study co-sponsored by
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) found that court oversight
of guardianships varies widely between jurisdictions.78 Lack of
funding for monitoring was cited as a problem,79 as was the failure
to verify the contents of guardians’ filed reports and the failure to
conduct visits to the wards.80 Around the same time, the ABA
teamed up with the American Psychological Association to publish
a guidebook for judges who adjudicate guardianships.81 The
guidebook outlined several practices for monitoring guardianships
to guide courts in ensuring this vital function is met, including use
of volunteer and other non-court resources.82
III. The Practice of Guardianship: What the Guardians Do
“To be sure, most guardians are honest and wellintentioned.”83
As unwieldy as the reformation of the
guardianship system in this country has proven to be, this is a
silver lining.
The introduction to the Third National
Guardianship Symposium’s collected reports describes a
continuum: “Anecdotal evidence suggests guardianship practice
can range from quietly heroic, to satisfactory, to unknowingly
deficient, to malfeasant,” but the authors note that the proportions
attributable to each category are not known.84 The court order
granting authority to a guardian is simple: make these decisions

76. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B § 5-309 (2014) (requiring the
guardian to file a report sixty days after appointment and annually thereafter, and
the court to establish a system for monitoring guardianships); MO. ANN. STAT. §
475.082 (West 2009) (requiring the court to evaluate the status of every person
under a guardianship annually, also requiring the guardian to file an annual
report).
77. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-655, GUARDIANSHIPS:
COLLABORATION NEEDED TO PROTECT INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE 9–12
(2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04655.pdf (describing broad categories and
methods of monitoring activities noted throughout the country).
78. Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of
Court Practices 31–35 (AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. et al., eds., 2006).
79. Id. at 24.
80. Id. at 22.
81. See ABA COMM’N ON L. & AGING & AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF CAPACITY OF OLDER ADULTS IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS: A
HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES (2006), https://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/
judges-diminished.pdf.
82. Id. at 56–58.
83. See Bayles & McCartney, supra note 29.
84. See Hurme & Wood, supra note 26, at 1162.
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on behalf of this person under these circumstances. The reality of
guardianship in practice, however, is much more complex.
Experts and advocates for guardianship reform have frequently
observed the many hats an effective guardian must wear:
[A] good guardian [must] be knowledgeable about housing and
long-term care options, community resources, protection and
preservation of the estate, accounting, medical and
psychological treatment, public benefits and communication
with elderly and disabled individuals. A guardian should
develop advocacy skills; assume “case management” functions;
monitor the ward’s living situation; make decisions that are, to
the greatest extent possible, in accord with the ward’s values;
avoid any conflict of interest; and regularly report to the
court.85

In recognition of the gravity of the role of the guardian and
the lack of post-adjudication support, all three National
Guardianship Symposia included training and education for
guardians as a component of their recommendations.86 Yet, only a
handful of states require training for non-professional guardians.87
Perhaps the most important thing a guardian needs to
understand is the standard upon which to base a decision. The
two prevailing standards are substituted judgment and best

85. Hurme & Wood, supra note 74, at 872 (quoting An Agenda for Reform,
supra note 33, at 296).
86. See An Agenda for Reform, supra note 33, at 296; Wingspan, supra note 40,
at 602, 605; Third National Guardianship, supra note 48, at 1200.
87. See, e.g., ADMIN. ORDER NO. 2012-62 (Ariz. 2012) (“Any person who is
neither a licensed fiduciary . . . nor a financial institution shall complete the
training . . . . The training shall be completed before letters to serve as guardian,
conservator, or personal representative are issued unless the appointment was
made . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3145 (West 2016) (setting out curriculum
requirements and requiring “[e]ach person appointed by the court to be a guardian
must complete the required number of hours of instruction and education within 4
months after his or her appointment as guardian. The instruction and education
must be completed through a course approved by the chief judge of the circuit court
and taught by a court-approved organization”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.39
(McKinney 2006) (“Each person appointed by the court to be a guardian must
complete a training program approved by the chief administrator which covers: 1.
the legal duties and responsibilities of the guardian; 2. the rights of the
incapacitated person; 3. the available resources to aid the incapacitated person; 4.
an orientation to medical terminology, particularly that related to the diagnostic
and assessment procedures used to characterize the extent and reversibility of any
impairment; 5. the preparation of annual reports, including financial accounting
for the property and financial resources of the incapacitated person.”); WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.88.020(3) (West 2006) (“If a guardian or limited guardian is not a
certified professional guardian or financial institution authorized under this
section, the guardian or limited guardian shall complete any standardized training
video or web cast for lay guardians made available by the administrative office of
the courts and the superior court where the petition is filed unless granted a
waiver by the court . . . .”).
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interest. In order to exercise substituted judgment, the decisionmaker must “attempt to establish, with as much accuracy as
possible, what healthcare decision an incompetent patient would
make if he or she were competent to do so.”88 The best interest
standard, by contrast, is an “attempt[] to weigh the burdens and
benefits of treatment to the patient in his present condition, when
no clear preferences of the patient can be determined.”89 While
substituted judgment asks what the person under a guardianship
would decide, the best interest standard asks, instead, what a
reasonable person would decide under the circumstances.90 The
UGPPA holds guardians to both standards: “A guardian, in
making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and
personal values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian.
A guardian at all times shall act in the ward’s best interest and
exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence.”91 This “dual
mandate”92 requires guardians to consider what the person under
a guardianship would decide for him or herself and what would
protect the person’s best interest.93 The addition of substituted
judgment to the UGPPA is a positive development, in that it gives
high priority to the self-determination interest of the ward.94 The
problem with applying both standards arises when there is discord
between them, i.e. what the person under a guardianship would
decide is not in his or her best interest. Despite the opportunity
for tension, the UGPPA at least provides a standard.
As of 2011, only about one-third of American states had
decision-making standards for guardians incorporated into their
statutes.95 Of those jurisdictions where a standard is articulated,
some are states that have adopted UGPPA.96 In the remaining
states, some articulate a hierarchy, requiring that the guardian
attempt to apply substituted judgment before resorting to a best
88. Substituted-Judgment Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d pocket ed.
2006).
89. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING
IN OUR AGING SOCIETY 231 (2005), http://hdl.handle.net/10822/559378 (emphasis in
original).
90. Id. at 231, 233.
91. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a), 8A U.L.A.
559 (1997).
92. Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted
Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform,
45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 741 (2012).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 744.
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interest decision.97 Other states name both standards, but do not
provide any guidance on which to use in preference to the other.98
Interpretation of the correct standard of decision-making is
often left to the judicial branch. The cases that inform our
collective legal knowledge on this subject often involve tragic
circumstances. In many cases, the person at the center of the
controversy dies before the appeal process is complete, even where
expedited appeals are allowed.99 In those situations where the
person survives the case, they are often languishing in a
persistent vegetative state without any hope of recovery.100 That
we now have this line of cases is due, at least in part, to advances
in medical science. In the landmark Quinlan case, one of the
physicians who examined Ms. Quinlan testified, “[T]hese things
have occurred all along but the technology has now reached a
point where you can in fact start to replace anything outside of the
brain to maintain something that is irreversibly damaged.”101
Prior to modern advances in medical science, “the physician
perceived his duty as that of making every conceivable effort to
prolong life.”102 With the emergence of the ability to stave off
death in the face of even the gravest diagnosis, a new type of
question arises: When is the cost of prolonging life too high? “The
debate here is . . . not between life and death; it is between quality
of life and death . . . .”103
In 1976, in Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court opened
the door for surrogates to make end-of-life decisions by allowing
Karen Quinlan’s father to render a decision to terminate lifesustaining treatment on her behalf.104 Such a decision rests on a
foundation of the constitutionally-protected right to privacy,
which, among other things, allows an adult to decide whether to
97. Id. at 744–45.
98. Id. at 746–47.
99. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66 n.1 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that
“Storar died after the case had been argued” in court); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422 (Mass. 1977) (stating
that Saikewicz died due to bronchial pneumonia, a complication of leukemia).
100. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 908–09 (Pa. 1996) (describing the attempt of a
mother/guardian to obtain court approval to remove a feeding tube from her adult
son who had been in a persistent vegetative state for approximately 16 years); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653–56 (N.J. 1976) (describing a father’s court petition to
remove life support from his daughter in a persistent vegetative state).
101. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 652 n.2.
102. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
103. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Mo. 1988).
104. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671–72 (remanding the case to the trial court to
“appoint Joseph Quinlan as guardian of the person of Karen Quinlan with full
power to make decisions with regard to the identity of her treating physicians”).
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refuse or terminate life-sustaining treatment.105 The right to
privacy remains vested, even in a person no longer able to
communicate their preferences, but where a surrogate decisionmaker speaks for the patient in a manner that will result in death,
the state’s interests must also be taken into account.106 To wit,
according to the Quinlan court, those interests are “the
preservation and sanctity of human life and defense of the right of
the physician to administer medical treatment according to his [or
her] best judgment.”107 The court came down firmly on the side of
substituted judgment as the guiding standard.
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if
Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not
altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she
would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible
condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of
the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of
natural death . . . . We have no hesitancy in deciding, in the
instant . . . case, that no external compelling interest of the
State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to
vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility
of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life. We
perceive no thread of logic distinguishing between such a
choice on Karen’s part and a similar choice which, under the
evidence in this case, could be made by a competent patient
terminally ill, riddled by cancer and suffering great
pain . . . .108

Fourteen years later, the United States Supreme Court
picked up the Quinlan thread to give guidance on the standard to
use when considering evidence of a previously-expressed wish to
forego life-sustaining treatment.109
The case concerned the
controversy over an end-of-life decision for Nancy Cruzan, who had
been in a persistent vegetative state since shortly after sustaining
injuries in an automobile accident seven years earlier.110 Nancy
was receiving her food and hydration via a feeding tube, and, after
it became clear that she would not recover, her parents sought to
have the tube removed and allow her to die.111 The hospital
required a court order to remove the feeding tube.112 The basis for
the Cruzans’ assertion that Nancy would not wish to be kept alive
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 662–64.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 266.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 268.
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in her present condition with no hope of recovery was a statement
she had made to a roommate some time before her incapacitating
accident.113 At the state court level, this evidence was rejected as
“unreliable for the purpose of determining [Nancy’s] intent,”114 and
insufficient to counterbalance Missouri’s “strong policy favoring
life.”115 The Missouri Supreme Court looked unfavorably upon the
use of substituted judgment in Nancy’s case:
As applied in right-to-terminate-treatment decisions, the
doctrine of substituted judgment is applied in abrogation of
the state’s parens patriae power, not in furtherance of it. In
cases like this one, the doctrine authorizes a guardian to cause
the death of a ward unilaterally, without interference by the
state, and contrary to the state’s vital interests in preserving
life and in assuring the safekeeping of those who cannot care
for themselves.116

In deference to the Quinlan decision, Missouri determined
that a guardian could undertake an end-of-life decision based on
substituted judgment, but that there must be clear and convincing
evidence of the incapacitated person’s prior-expressed wishes.117
The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the lower
court’s decision to affirm the requirement of clear and convincing
evidence of an individual’s prior-expressed wishes before allowing
a surrogate to exercise the right-to-die on his or her behalf.118
IV. Guardianship of Persons with Intellectual Disability:
What the Law Says
As the underlying reason for incapacity, intellectual
disability is distinct from the disabling condition of an elder adult
or the minority of a child. By statute or regulation, each state
provides a cut-off age by which a person’s intellectual disability
must be manifest, with the states falling into one of two groups:
113. Id.
114. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988).
115. Id. at 426.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 415.
118. The Supreme Court wrote:
In sum, we conclude that a State may apply a clear and convincing
evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue
nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent
vegetative state. We note that many courts which have adopted some sort
of substituted judgment procedure in situations like this, whether they
limit consideration of evidence to the prior expressed wishes of the
incompetent individual, or whether they allow more general proof of what
the individual’s decision would have been, require a clear and convincing
standard of proof for such evidence.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
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those calling for identification before the age of eighteen,119 and
those that allow an additional four years, setting the cut-off age at
twenty-two.120 Intellectual disability is one of several types of
developmental disabilities, meaning that the onset of the condition
occurs during childhood.121 These individuals are, therefore,
distinct from elderly adults after the onset of a disabling condition
(who once had capacity) and from non-disabled children (who
presumably one day will). Guardianship laws do not always
recognize a difference.
A few states have laws that specify separate procedures for
persons in need of decisional support by reason of an intellectual
disability.122 The focus of some laws is to simplify the process for
families and caregivers to arrange for guardians to assist these
vulnerable adults.123 Procedure is taken away, not added. Other
states go to great lengths to include additional protections.124 Still
119. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.063(9) (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-2161(f) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.005(4) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14,
§ 3061(1)(a) (2010).
120. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-1-1(8) (2012); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.21.010
(2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1205 (2014); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(22)
(McKinney 2011).
121. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 33, 38–39 (5th ed. 2013).
122. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-669–684 (2014); IDAHO CODE § 66-404 (2015).
123. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-2A-102(e) (LexisNexis 2009) (“The custodial
parent or parents or an adult custodial sibling of an adult child who is
incapacitated by reason of an intellectual disability, may file, in lieu of a petition, a
written request to be appointed guardian of his or her adult child or his or her
adult sibling in order to continue performing custodial and other parental
responsibilities or family responsibilities, or both responsibilities, for the child after
the child has passed his or her minority. The court may waive any or all
procedural requirements of the Uniform Guardianship Act, including notice and
service, and appointments, and interviews.
The adult child alleged to be
incapacitated shall have had an examination by a physician or other qualified
person and furnish a written report of the findings to the court. In lieu of a
hearing, the probate court shall hold an informal hearing with the custodial parent
or custodial parents or custodial adult sibling requesting the guardianship, the
adult child for whom the guardianship is sought, and a guardian ad litem for the
adult child chosen by the judge of probate.”) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
393.12(1)–(2) (West 2011) (advising, on one hand, that a person with a
developmental disability is not considered incapacitated solely by reason of the
individual’s acceptance and receipt of services, but, on the other hand, providing
that a court can appoint a “guardian advocate,” vested with the same authority as a
traditional guardian, without first making a finding of incapacity).
124. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(d) (West 2016) (“A limited conservator of
the person or of the estate, or both, may be appointed for a developmentally
disabled adult. A limited conservatorship may be utilized only as necessary to
promote and protect the well-being of the individual, shall be designed to encourage
the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the individual, and
shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual’s proven mental
and adaptive limitations. The conservatee of the limited conservator shall not be
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others have laws on the books that seem to conflate the
intellectual disability with incapacity.125
Often, the laws
addressing guardianship for persons with intellectual disability
are found in a separate section of the code from the state’s
traditional guardianship statutes.126
Even when a guardian is needed to help with some decisions,
people who live with intellectual disability do not necessarily lack
capacity to make all decisions. For example, In re M.R. was a New
Jersey Supreme Court case involving a young woman with both
Down syndrome and an intellectual disability in the mild to
moderate range.127 The controversy arose when M.R. expressed a
preference to live with her father, rather than her mother, with
whom she resided at the time of the case and who was her
appointed guardian.128 M.R.’s mother refused to allow the move
presumed to be incompetent and shall retain all legal and civil rights except those
which by court order have been designated as legal disabilities and have been
specifically granted to the limited conservator. The intent of the Legislature. . . that
developmentally disabled citizens of this state receive services resulting in more
independent, productive, and normal lives is the underlying mandate of this
division in its application to adults alleged to be developmentally disabled.”)
(emphasis added); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351.5 (West 2016) (expanding California
protections for adults with intellectual disability, providing that the limited
conservator is precluded from exercising decision-making authority over seven
areas, unless authority is requested in the petition and granted in the order:
residential placement, execution of releases of information; consent to marriage or
entry into a domestic partnership, consent to enter into a contract, consent for
provision or withholding of medical treatment; consent to sexual and social
relationships, and education decisions); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1620 (West
1999) (“A court order establishing partial guardianship shall contain findings of
fact, shall define the powers and duties of the partial guardian so as to permit the
individual with a developmental disability to care for himself or herself and his or
her property commensurate with his or her ability to do so, and shall specify all
legal disabilities to which the individual is subject.”).
125. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750 (McKinney 2011) (authorizing
the court to appoint a guardian where it is demonstrated that the person is
“mentally retarded,” is “incapable [of] manag[ing] him or herself,” and that
appointment of a guardianship is in the person’s best interest).
126. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-551.01(H) (2010) (“Persons with
developmental disabilities have the right to presumption of legal competency in
guardianship proceedings,” which is found in Title 36, Public Health and Safety,
whereas traditional guardianship statutes are located in Title 14, Trusts, Estates,
and Protective Proceedings); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1600–1644 (West
1999) (locating the Guardianship for the Developmentally Disabled statute sections
in Chapter 330, Mental Health Code, whereas traditional guardianship statutes
are located in Chapter 700, Estates and Protected Individuals Code); N.Y. SURR.
CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1750–1761 (McKinney 2011) (locating the Guardians of Mentally
Retarded and Developmentally Disabled Persons statute sections in the Surrogate
Court Procedures Act, whereas traditional guardianship statutes are located in the
Mental Hygiene Law).
127. 638 A.2d 1274, 1276 (N.J. 1994).
128. Id.
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on the grounds that M.R. lacked capacity to make the decision to
relocate to her father’s house.129 M.R.’s father advocated his
daughter’s position.130
The court reversed the mother’s
appointment as guardian and remanded to the lower court to
make specific findings as to M.R.’s capacity to express a reliable
preference about where to live.131 In justifying its decision, the
court drew an important and often-overlooked distinction between
the type of decision M.R. was attempting to make and other, more
permanent decisions:
We are reminded also that the mere fact that a person is
generally incompetent does not mean that person is
incompetent for all purposes . . . . A person who is generally
incompetent can still make choices about specific matters.
Depending on the facts of the case, someone who is unable to
manage his or her own affairs may still be capable of deciding
where and with whom to live . . . . A second distinction . . .
concerns the seriousness of the incompetent’s decision. The
decision where to live, if proved incorrect, can be corrected
more easily than can the decision to be sterilized. We
recognize the argument that as a decision increases in
importance, so should the right of the affected person to make
that decision . . . . Our goal is to permit developmentallydisabled people to make as many decisions as possible, while
protecting them from the harmful effects of bad decisions that
they do not fully understand.132

The lesson from In re M.R. seems to be that the level of
specific competence needed to make a decision increases with the
gravity and irreversibility of that decision.133 It is, therefore, not
unexpected that the area where the judicial branch most
frequently steps in is health care decisions. Although there is not
a lot of reported case law involving health care decisions for
persons with intellectual disability, two examples illustrate the
unique difficulties faced by courts in evaluating how surrogate
decisions should be made for these individuals.
In the first case, a Massachusetts man named Joseph
Saikewicz lived all but the first twenty of his sixty-seven years at
Belchertown State School, an institution for the care of individuals
with intellectual disability.134 His life was impacted by an
intellectual impairment that was classified in the profound
129. Id. at 1276.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1282.
132. Id. at 1281.
133. Id.
134. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
420 (Mass. 1977).
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range.135 In 1976, Joseph was diagnosed with incurable leukemia;
even with treatment, he had only months to live.136 Joseph could
not communicate his own wishes, and, as he had no involved
family willing to serve as his legal decision-maker, the
administrator of the school sought the guidance from the court.137
A guardian ad litem was appointed, and made the
recommendation not to treat Joseph, on the grounds that Joseph
would not be able to understand the treatment, which, if
administered, would lead to fear, pain, and little extension of
life.138 The probate court judge issued an order agreeing with the
recommendation of the guardian ad litem, but asked the higher
court to review the decision.139 The Superior Court issued an
order affirming the probate decision, and Joseph died about eight
weeks after the order without receiving chemotherapy, but in
relative comfort.140 Several months later, the court issued a
written opinion explaining its decision, thereby providing the first
guidance we have about medical decisions for people with
intellectual disability.
As a threshold matter, the Saikewicz court noted that
persons who lack capacity have the same substantive right to
decline medical treatment as everyone else.141 The court found
that the most appropriate way to approach a surrogate decision is
to attempt, as nearly as possible, to determine the ward’s actual
interests and preferences, and be guided by those.142 In short, the
court advocated a substituted judgment standard, but stopped
short of developing guidelines for guardians making healthcare
decisions.143
Four years later, the New York Court of Appeals reached the
opposite conclusion in In re Storar.144 This opinion was the
consolidation of two cases. The first concerned Joseph Fox, a
member of a Catholic religious order, who, at the age of eighty-

135. Id.
136. Id. at 420–21.
137. Id. at 419.
138. Id.
139. Id. at n.2.
140. Id. at 419–22.
141. Id. at 423.
142. Id. at 431.
143. Id. at 432 n.18 (“We decline the invitation of several of the amicus and
party briefs to formulate a comprehensive set of guidelines applicable generally to
emergency medical situations involving incompetent persons. Such a wide-ranging
effort is better left to the legislative branch after appropriate study.”).
144. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981).
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three, suffered cardiac arrest during an operation.145 In order to
be kept alive, Brother Fox was kept on a respirator, but the lack of
oxygen to his brain left him in a persistent vegetative state.146
The director of his order petitioned the court to honor Brother
Fox’s prior-expressed wish not to be kept alive by such
measures.147
By contrast, fifty-two-year-old John Storar had lived almost
all of his life in an institution due to his intellectual disability and
accompanying deficits, described to be in the profound range.148
Around the same time as Brother Fox’s surgery, John was
diagnosed with bladder cancer.149 His mother was appointed his
guardian and approved radiation treatment for the cancer, which
subsequently went into remission.150 The cancer returned the
following year and was then determined to be terminal.151 As a
result of the cancer, John developed internal bleeding and
required transfusions.152
His mother initially consented but
withdrew her consent because John was apprehensive about the
transfusions and resisted them.153 It was uncontroverted among
the experts that John’s bladder cancer would result in his death
within a few months, and that not receiving the transfusions
would hasten his death.154
The court took the opportunity to juxtapose these cases and
draw a distinction between surrogate end-of-life decision-making
on behalf of a person who once had capacity to make his own
decisions and a person who never had such capacity.155 There was
no difficulty in disposing of Brother Fox’s case; there was sufficient
evidence of his previous comments—repeated two months prior to
his final hospitalization—to support a finding that he would not
want to remain alive under the circumstances.156 The court
passed over the constitutional privacy right that the Quinlan court

145. Id. at 67.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 67–68.
148. Id. at 68.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 68–69.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 69–70.
154. Id. at 69.
155. Id. at 73 (“[T]his case bears only superficial similarities to [Br. Fox’s
situation] and the determination must proceed from different principles.”).
156. Id. at 72.
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rested upon, saying rather that Brother Fox had a common law
right to refuse treatment.157
In the second case, the court noted that John never had
capacity to make his own decisions: “Thus it is unrealistic to
attempt to determine whether he would want to continue
potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent.”158 For
this court, the important distinction was that the blood
transfusions could successfully treat the loss of blood indefinitely,
and without excessive pain.159 The court looked at the blood loss
in isolation from the cancer. With the transfusions, John was
essentially as he was before; without them, he became weak,
listless, and faced an earlier death.160 Citing law regarding health
care decisions for children, the court found that the benefits of the
blood transfusions to John outweighed the burdens, and the
treatment was thus in his best interest.161
There is some consensus that, while self-determination and
preservation of autonomy point to use of a substituted judgment
standard for many decisions, for health care decisions, the better
standard is best interest.162 One author notes:
Although people with [intellectual disability] are capable of
gaining (or losing) skills over time, the level of an individual’s
underlying intellectual impairment does not change
appreciably. As a result, it will seldom be possible to refer to
an individual’s preferences as expressed during a previous
period of greater decisional capacity.163

The definition of the term “substituted judgment doctrine”
includes this qualifier: “Generally, the doctrine is used for a
person who was once competent, but no longer is.”164 It would
seem, then, that substituted judgment should rarely be used as
157. Id. at 70.
158. Id. at 72.
159. Id. at 73.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope
for the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1541, 1556 (2012) (“One practical application of
best interest comes when decisions are being made for end of life or for significant
acute medical choices, including ending life.”); AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
A GUIDE TO CONSENT 52 (Robert D. Dinerstein et al. eds., 1999) (regarding medical
decisions when the person is unable to give consent, “[t]he guardian stands in the
place of the person and must act in the best interest of the person”) [hereinafter A
GUIDE TO CONSENT].
163. James W. Ellis, Decisions by and for People with Mental Retardation:
Balancing Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1779, 1790
(1992).
164. Substituted Judgment Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 686 (3d pocket
ed. 2006).
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the only standard for making health care decisions for an adult
with intellectual disability.
V. Guardianship of Persons with Intellectual Disability:
Practical Problems
There are some troubling facts surrounding health care
outcomes for people whose lives are impacted by an intellectual
disability. A growing number of studies substantiate claims that
health disparities exist across several measures for people with
intellectual disability as compared with the general population.165
Absent a physician’s recommendation to the contrary, people with
intellectual disability should receive screening tests (e.g.,
cardiovascular screening, cancer screening) at least as often as
members of the general population.166 Although these individuals
have about the same rates of cancer as the general population,167
they receive routine cancer screenings far less frequently, or not at
all, and are more likely to die of cancer.168 A 1999 study found
that breast cancer deaths among individuals with cerebral palsy, a
condition often co-occurring with intellectual disability,169 were
three times higher than in the general population.170 The authors
of the study hypothesized that this was at least in part due to
failure of timely diagnosis and treatment in this group.171
165. See Havercamp et al., supra note 4, at 420–25.
166. Joanne E. Wilkenson et. al., Screening Tests for Adults with Intellectual
Disabilities, 20 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 399, 399 (2007) (asserting that evidencebased screening recommendations are lacking among adults with intellectual
disabilities, and there is a need to examine screening recommendations using
guidelines of the US Preventative Service Task Force).
167. Kristina Patja et al., Cancer Incidence Among People with Intellectual
Disability, 45 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 300, 305 (2001) (finding “[i]n the present
study, the incidence of cancer among people with [intellectual disability] was
comparable with the general population, despite their low prevalence of smoking
and apparently decreased involvement in diagnostic screening activities”).
168. See Havercamp et al., supra note 4, at 424–25; Greenwood et al., supra note
4, at 444.
169. See, e.g., Amy Thornhill Pakula et al., Cerebral Palsy: Classification and
Epidemiology, 20 PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION CLINICS N. AM. 425, 442 (2009)
(“More than half of individuals with CP have some type of intellectual or
neuropsychological impairment . . . .”); J.L. Hutton & P.O.D. Pharoah, Effects of
Cognitive, Motor, and Sensory Disabilities on Survival in Cerebral Palsy, 86
ARCHIVES DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 84, 86 (2002) (finding 1,335 of 1,942 children,
living and dead, approximately sixty-nine percent with cerebral palsy in the study
sample also had a cognitive disability).
170. David Strauss et al., Causes of Excess Mortality in Cerebral Palsy, 41 DEV.
MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 580, 584 (1999) (stating that, for individuals with
cerebral palsy, “death from breast cancer is three times more likely than in a group
of comparable age and sex distribution in the general population”).
171. Id. (stating that “[i]n a population with development disability and frequent
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How does this implicate guardians? In the real world,
guardians of persons with intellectual disability are a subset of
decisional support available to adults with diminished capacity.172
Because an individual under a guardianship is, in effect, “reduced
to the status of a child in the eyes of the law[,]”173 most advocates
agree that guardianship should be the last port of call.174
Guardians, thus, are part of a larger group of supporters who
assist adults with intellectual disabilities in making decisions, in
ways that are recognized formally at law (e.g., powers of attorney,
representative payees) and in ways that are not (e.g., family
support of a legally-competent adult who needs help with some
decisions). There is a growing body of research that tends to
indicate that some of these supported decisions are different from
the decisions the average person would make for him or herself,
particularly in the area of healthcare. Consider the following
examples.
In one study, sixteen mothers and sisters of women with
intellectual disability submitted to interviews exploring their
perspectives on mammography for their loved one.175 Although
family members reported that they valued quality health care for
their daughter or sister, they hesitated to schedule mammograms,
citing worries that a cancer screening and diagnosis would lead to
unnecessary suffering.176 Those interviewed also reported worries
about the inability of their loved one to understand the rationale
for cancer treatment, and one sister reported, “We’re not as
aggressive as we would be if it was me, or my husband.”177
Several participants, however, also reported stories where they
were surprised by their loved one’s resilience.178 In particular, one
mother, who dreaded taking her daughter for her first
mammogram, reported, “[W]e got up to the plate, and this very
nice young woman came out, and [my daughter] said ‘okay you can
wait here.’ And she went with the woman and she did a great job.
She did a really, really good job.”179 A second study, conducted in
difficulty in communication, delay in diagnosis of cancer may be common”).
172. Horstman, supra note 18, at 217.
173. Id. at 231.
174. A GUIDE TO CONSENT, supra note 162, at 10–11 (“Because guardianship is
such an invasive procedure and has such long-lasting consequences for the person
with disabilities, it is best to seek alternatives if at all possible.”).
175. Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 446.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 448.
178. Id. at 449.
179. Id.
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2010, asked nurses who provide services to persons with
intellectual and developmental disabilities about the barriers to
cancer screenings for these patients.180 Twenty-six percent of
study participants reported that they had experienced instances
where a screening was ordered, but the family refused.181
It is not just the attitudes of family members providing
support that can lead to poor decisions. Even in these times,
people with intellectual disabilities face “discriminatory social
attitudes,” and this experience sometimes extends to the doctor’s
office.182 Among the answers provided by the nurses in the study
described above were several that point to a need for greater
education in the health care community about patients with
intellectual disabilities.183 As a result, sometimes the reason for
lower numbers of screening and treatment is that a physician or
nurse advised the family against the procedure, and a decision
consistent with that medical advice was made.184 The need for
additional education among health care providers has been
repeatedly recognized.185
As long as there are health care
providers who make different recommendations for persons with
intellectual disability than for their other patients, those providing
180. Carl V. Tyler et al., Nursing Perspectives on Cancer Screenings in Adults
with Intellectual and Other Disabilities, 48 INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 271, 272
(2010).
181. Id. at 273 tbl.1.
182. Allison A. Brown & Carol J. Gill, New Voices in Women’s Health:
Perceptions of Women with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 47 INTELL.
& DEV. DISABILITIES 337, 343 (2009).
183. Tyler notes several answers that reflect the acceptance of health care
conditions/outcomes for persons with intellectual disability distinct from the
general population:
The individual’s behaviors/lack of cooperation does not permit screenings
to be completed without additional intervention (i.e., sedation, etc.);
Cancer screening tests are attempted, but they are not successfully
completed; They have preventive health care visits, but cancer screenings
are NOT ordered; The individual is fearful; Cancer screening tests are
ordered, but the individual refuses them; The individual/family does not
understand the benefit of cancer screening.
Tyler et al., supra note 180, at 273.
184. See, e.g., Jamie G. Swaine et al., Family Caregivers’ Perspectives on Barriers
and Facilitators of Cervical and Breast Cancer Screenings for Women with
Intellectual Disability, 51 INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 62, 68 (2013); Havercamp,
supra note 4, at 424.
185. See, e.g., Brown & Gill, supra note 182, at 345 (“Improving the quality of
health care for women with intellectual and developmental disabilities
requires . . . health providers address their own need for adequate skills and
training in both disability and women’s health.”); Tyler et al., supra note 180, at
274 (noting that the nurses who participated in the survey identified a need for
education in the health care community as one of the greatest barriers to provision
of cancer screenings to the women with intellectual disability).
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decisional support stand in a position of pivotal importance as
health care advocates.
The attitude of the person in need of decisional support can
also be a problem. Many adults with intellectual disability do not
consider themselves disabled and regard any indicia of disability
as stigmatizing.186 These individuals will often go to great lengths
to defend their autonomy and avoid seeking clarification of things
they don’t understand. As a result, they can often appear to have
greater decisional capacity than they actually possess.187 Latent
limitations of understanding present very serious risks where
decisional supporters rely exclusively upon the stated preferences
of the person with an intellectual disability. As a baseline
example of how this can be a problem, research suggests that
significant numbers of adults with intellectual disability have an
incomplete understanding of death.188
Thus, an expressed
preference of an individual with an intellectual disability to forego
life-saving treatment must, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, be considered in light of a probable imperfect
understanding of the finality of the consequence of that decision.
On the contrary, an evident joy of life in a person with an
intellectual disability can be viewed as evidence that the
individual, to be quite blunt, does not want to be dead.189
VI. Striking a Balance Between Advocacy and Protection
It is important to point out that the discussion that follows is
based upon a presumption of a guardian appropriately appointed
to make decisions on behalf of a person who has been
demonstrated to lack capacity to make those decisions for him or
herself. This is not always the case. Guardianship appointments
186. Brown & Gill, supra note 182, at 342; ROBERT B. EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF
COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 131–32
(University of California Press rev. & updated 1993). Edgerton offers insight into
how adults with mild to moderate intellectual disability become so strongly
committed to avoiding the stigma of their diagnosis after an institutional
experience that leaves “the patient without privacy, without clear identity, without
autonomy of action, without relatives, friends, or family, in a regimented and
impersonal institution where everything combines to inform him that he is, in fact,
mentally inadequate.” Id. at 132.
187. Ellis, supra note 163, at 1792.
188. See John McEvoy et al., Concept of Death and Perceptions of Bereavement in
Adults with Intellectual Disabilities, 56 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 191, 199 (2012).
189. In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 (Mass. 1993) (finding evidence that an
individual with Down syndrome under her mother’s guardianship would choose to
undergo life-saving dialysis if she had capacity based, in part, on a finding that
“she has always engaged in a variety of activities strongly suggestive of a desire to
enjoy and prolong life”).
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that are unnecessary and overbroad are the subject of substantial
literature, and calls for reform are ongoing.190 In fact, there is a
strong argument that an undue guardianship of an individual
with intellectual disability constitutes a civil rights violation.191
The comments below are restricted to guardianships that are
necessary and appropriate.
One of the lessons that comes from the foregoing analysis is
that there is often tension between maximizing individual selfdetermination and making decisions promoting the best interest of
the individual with an intellectual disability. This is further
complicated by the vast range in functional ability that lies
between those with the mildest intellectual disability and those
with the most severe.192 The very label of intellectual disability
evokes stigma and can obscure the reality that this diverse cohort
of our population has rich potential, talent, and ability that
benefits society. Balancing the rules of advocate and protector can
be incredibly frustrating, even for those with a strong grasp of the
distinction between the two. The history of guardianship in the
United States is a vivid illustration of a strong inclination toward
protectiveness, often at the expense of advocacy.
Although the tenets of person-centeredness promote shifting
focus to the person’s strength and away from the disability, a
diagnosis can be instructive, particularly for attorneys and judges
with limited experience in this area. It is reasonable to presume
that there is almost always some specific competence in a person
diagnosed with an intellectual disability, particularly with those
falling in the mild to moderate range. Even a person whose
communication is so compromised that he or she cannot express
the most basic choice has some way of showing preference. For
instance, a person may not be able to provide informed consent to
take a medication he or she has never taken. But, after some

190. See Margaret “Jenny” Hatch et al., Unjustified Isolation Is Discrimination:
The Olmstead Case Against Overbroad and Undue Organizational and Public
Guardianship, 3 INCLUSION 65 (2015).
191. Id. In addition to the general analysis, Unjustified Isolation Is
Discrimination contains a first-hand account of a woman’s life during the year she
spent under an organizational guardianship.
192. Ellis writes:
The severity of intellectual impairment within the class of people we label
as having [intellectual disability] varies greatly. It has been observed that
within the class of people who have [intellectual disability], individuals at
the highest level of functioning have less in common with those at the
lowest level of functioning than they have in common with people who
have no intellectual handicap at all.
Ellis, supra note 163, at 1783.
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experience, he or she may be able to provide feedback on whether
the medication is effective or what side effects he or she
experiences, and make an informed choice among available
alternatives. Similarly, while an individual may not be able to
competently choose whether or not to go to a medical specialist, he
or she might be able to choose which doctor among those available
he or she would prefer to see.
As the court advised in In re M.R., the amount of decisional
support needed increases with the gravity and irreversibility of
the decision.193 For example, the same person who is competent to
choose where and with whom to live may not be able to make an
informed decision to consent to or forego a medical procedure. The
problem is that there is no single test for specific competency.
Because there are many variables that impact decision-making, it
really is a distinct set of skills from person to person that can
change over time. The level of intellectual disability is a guidepost
for judges and guardians ad litem. Where the individual has a
mild or moderate impairment, it is likely prudent to find out what
types of decisions he or she can make independently or with
informal support.194 Where appropriate, specific types of decisions
can even be reserved to the individual in the guardianship order.
A final point is this: although a guardian is appointed in a
protective capacity, some guardians have little or inaccurate
understanding of what that means.
Recall the stories of
caregivers who avoided medical screenings because of their
concerns about their loved one’s ability to withstand the
procedure, or their own fears of what would happen in the face of a
diagnosis. These are often family members who believe that they
are protecting their loved one and advocating for his or her best
interest. In reality, this is neither protection nor advocacy and can
lead directly to adverse results, even death.
When a recommendation for routine medical screening
challenges a guardian’s belief about what is best for the ward, or
what the ward can withstand, the guardian, without further
support or direction, may make a decision that violates his or her
protective mandate. This can happen while the guardian believes,
in all sincerity, that he or she is acting in the best interest of his or
her family member. Front-end guidance from the court, either
directly or through mandatory training, can be powerful in
193. In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1281 (N.J. 1994).
194. See, e.g., Tina M. Campanella, Supported Decision-Making in Practice, 3
INCLUSION 35 (2015) (describing an emerging model for assisting persons with
intellectual disability in making decisions without utilizing a formal guardianship).
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combating this type of well-intentioned mischief. The rule of
thumb is simple: absent guidance from a doctor to the contrary, a
person with an intellectual disability should receive the same
wellness care, screenings, and treatments as would a member of
the general population with the same resources. This is the very
protection for which a guardian is appointed. Making that
expectation clear in a courtroom setting may be, by itself, the
single most powerful protection that can be given.

